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Tangier Sound Waterman's Association v. Douglas: 
CHESAPEAKE BAY BLUE CRAB RESIDENCY 
RESTRICTIONS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
By Alison Rieser and Nancy Ziegler * 
A recent federal district court decision, Tangier Sound Water-
man's Association v. Douglas, 1 reopened the debate on a fun-
damental issue of marine resource management: under what cir-
cumstances will a state have the authority to limit access by 
nonresidents to fisheries found within its boundaries? 
The Tangier Sound Waterman's Association brought suit in 
March, 1981 against the Commonwealth of Virginia, its marine 
resources commission and the Commissioner, James E. 
Douglas, Jr., challenging state licensing laws which denied 
nonresidents the right to commercially harvest blue crab in 
Virginia waters of the Chesapeake Bay/ The plaintiffs were 
commercial crab fishermen who reside on an .island within the 
Bay which is bisected by the boundary between Virginia and 
Maryland. 1 Because of Virginia's residency restrictions, these 
fishermen were unable to pursue their migratory catch across 
the state border into Virginia waters. This prohibiti.on shortened 
the fishing season for Maryland crabbers, since the crabs are 
plentiful in Maryland waters only during summer months. 4 The 
Maryland Department of Natural Resources intervened as a par-
ty defendant on the grounds that it was responsible for 
upholding a similar statutory scheme in Maryland and that it 
would be adversely affected by a decision striking down the 
Virginia residency laws.') 
* Reprinted from 'l'lie Territorial Sea, Vol JI, No. 2 (1982), 
courtesy of The Marine Law lllstitute, Universi(y of Sout/Jem 
1\lah1e, 2,16 Deering Ave., Portland, ME 04102. 
'541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982). 
'The plainliffs broughl a civil action seeking declarative and in-
junctive relief from the following Virginia Jaws: VA. CoDE § 28.1-165 
(1979) provides that residents of Virginia n'l.ust obtain licenses from the 
Virginia Marine Resources Commission to commercially harvest blue 
crabs. There is no limit on the number of such licenses which may be 
granted to residents of the state. Under VA. CODE§ 28.1-57 (1979), it is 
a misdemeanor for a nonresident of the state to take or catch fish in 
tidal waters of that state other than by "line, rod or pole held in hand." 
Crabs are fish within the meaning of the statute. See· VA. CODE§ 28.1-2 
(1979). VA. CODE§ 28.1-122 (1979) makes it a misdemeanor for any per-
son other than a resident of Virginia to take or catch fish or shellfish 
from Virginia waters for market or profit. Finally, it is a misdemeanor 
under VA, CoDE § 1-123 (1979) for a Virginia resident who, for market 
or profit, is "concerned or interested" with any nonresident in taking or 
catching fish or shellfish in Virginia waters, or who knowingly permits a 
nonresident to engage in any such business. 
iThe Tangier Sound Waterman's Association is an unincorporated 
association of about 120 commercial fishermen, all residing in 
Maryland on Smith Island or in the vicinity of Crisfield on the eastern 
shore of the Bay. The Association members are either full or part-time 
commercial crab fishermen. The three named plaintiffs were Elmer W. 
On June 25, 1982, Judge D. Dortch Warriner of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held 
that the state statutes excluding nonresidents from catching 
crabs in Virginia waters violated the privileges and immunities 
clause of the United States Constitution. 6 This ruling, in view of 
Virginia's decision not to appeal, opens the Chesapeake Bay 
blue crab fishery to all fishermen with valid licenses, regardless 
of state residency, 
The Tangier Sound ruling could have a profound impact on 
state licensing laws limiting access to commercial fisheries found 
within state boundaries to residents of the state. This follows re· 
cent court decisions applying the privileges and immunities 
clause and the commerce clause to highly discriminatory state 
resource management laws. 1 
The law recognizes that a state has a substantial interest in the 
fish and wildlife resources found within its borders. Traditional-
ly, this interest was described in terms of "ownership" of the 
resource. 3 Under the state ownership theory, discriminatory 
state wildlife management practices, such as the total exclusion 
of nonresidents from any access to the resources, or the imposi-
tion of exorbitant licensing fees on nonresidents, were con-
sidered immune from constitutional attack. 9 The Tangier Sound 
decision signals the emergence of the privileges and immunities 
clause as a legal basis for challenging residency restrictions for 
commercial fisheries. This article analyzes the Tangier Sound 
case in light of the traditional legal framework for state resource 
mariagement and the evolution of the privileges and immunities 
clause as a constitutional limitation on discriminatory state fish 
and wildlife laws. 
Evans, President of the Association and owner of a fishing vessel 
federally licensed for the "mackerel" fishery under the Enrollment and 
Licensing statutes, see 46 U.S.C. § 251 et seq. (1952 and Cum. Supp. 
1982); Edwin C. Smith, III, also federally licensed; and David D. Laird, 
whose crabbing skiff did not qualify for federal licensing. Tangier 
Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1289. 
'\V. WARNER, BEAUTIFUL SWIMMERS: WATERMEN, CRABS AND THE 
CHESAPEAKE BAY 6 (1976). 
1Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1290. 
'Id. at 1301. 
'Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Hicklin v. Orbeck,• 
U.S. 518 (1978); Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 3. 
(1978); Douglas v, Seacoasl Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977). 
1£.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by 
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); McCready v. Virginia, 94 
U.S. 391 (1876); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 
(1842). 
'Mccready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396 (1876). See also Corfield 
v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825). 
Tangier Sound Fishermen and Their Quarry, the 
Blue Crab 
The controversy in Tangier Sound centered around a crusta-
cean known for its agility in the water, hence its name, 
Ca!linectes sapidus Rathbun, which literally means "btautiful 
swimmer". 10 Because of its mobility, the blue crab is capable of 
migrating great distances within its habitat, the waters of the 
Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic Ocean along the eastern 
seaboard. This migratory pattern distinguishes the blue crab 
from sedentary species of shellfish, which adhere to the rocks of 
the Bay floor, and from free-swimming fin fish, which can range 
from internal state waters of the Bay far out into the fishery 
conservation zone. 11 
The typical yearly migratory cycle for the blue crab begins and 
ends in the shallow waters fed by fresh tributaries in the north-
ern reaches of the Bay in Maryland and Virginia, where the 
crabs spawn, hatch larvae and feed on eelgrass and marsh 
vegetation. In the fall, the male crabs move to the deep channel 
in the central and southern portions of the Bay, primarily in 
Virginia waters, where they sit out the winter buried in the mud 
on the Bay floor. The females also migrate south, to areas near 
the mouth of the Bay, to hibernate. 11 Since Maryland and 
Virginia have traditionally prohibited the harvesting of crabs by 
nonresidents in their respective waters, 13 commercial fishing ac-
tivity by Chesapeake Bay, crabbers has been dictated by these 
seasonal migrations and the more erratic changes in crab con-
centrations brought on by changes in salinity levels in parts of 
the Bay. 14 Marylanders harvest crabs only in the summer months 
when the crabs are concentrated in their waters. Unlike Virginia, 
which allow.s virtually year-round harvesting, 1 5 Maryland pro-
hibits winter dredging of hibernating crabs from the Bay floor. 16 
Virginia's residency restrictions make it Hle8aI for those 
fishermen who live on the Maryland portion of Smith Island to 
follow their quarry around to the Virginia side. The state line 
substantially diminishes the range that larger Maryland boats 
would normally have for fishing. While both states prohibit out-
of-staters from harvesting crabs within their waters, there is no 
corollary prohibition against marketing the catch in either state, 
or elsewhere along the eastern seaboard and around the 
country. 11 
Despite the mounting frustration for the fishermen and 
repeated violations of the residency laws, 18 neither Maryland 
nor Virginia seriously considered opening their waters to out-of-
staters to harvest blue crabs. Residency laws were an integral 
10Callinectes is Greek for beautiful swimmer; sapidus means tasty 
or savory in Latin; the late Dr. Mary J. Rathbun first named the blue 
crab. w. WARNER, BEAUTIFUL SWIMMERS: WATERMEN, CRABS AND THE 
CHESAPEAKE BAY 90 (1976). 
11 /d. at 6. 
11/d. at 34, 100. 
11Maryland has a residency requirement for commercial crabbing 
licenses similar to Virginia's. M.D. ANN CooE art. 4, § 805 (1974). 
"Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1290. 
"VA. CODE § 28.1-170 & 172 (1979). 
16Mo. ANN. CooE art. 4, § 803 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1981). 
"Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1289. 
"The frustration created by the state residency restrictions occa-
sionally spilled over into violence when fishermen challenged the laws 
and strayed over the state boundary. The most shocking episode oc-
curred in 1949, when a leader of the Maryland crabbers crossed the 
border to fish for crabs on the Virginia side. When Virginian law 
enforcement officers sought to detain his boat, the fisherman attempted 
to flee to Maryland waters and was killed by the Virginian authorities. 
w. \VARNER, BEAUTIFUL Swn,H,iERS: WATERMEN, CRABS AND THE 
CHESAPEAKE BAY 221 (1976). 
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component of management of the resources, both for conserva-
tion efforts and for law enforcement on the Chesapeake Bay. 
The states never agreed on any form of reciprocity in their crab 
laws, which would have allowed all crabbers to harvest the 
resource throughout the Bay. 19 
The failure of the state legislature to act cooperatively, plus 
the continued frustrations of the Maryland crabbers, led to the 
suit by the Tangier Sound \Vaterman's Association following 
the unsuccessful attempts by several members of the Association 
to obtain Virginia crab licenses. In addition, two of the named 
plaintiffs possessed federal fishing licenses, yet were still denied 
the right to harvest crabs in Virginia waters on the basis of 
nonresidency. 10 
The Parties' Arguments 
The plaintiffs challenged the Virginia residency laws on the 
grounds that these statutes violated the commerce clause, the 
privileges and immunities clause, and the equal protection 
clause of the United States Constitution. They also argued that 
the Virginia laws were preempted by federal law under the 
supremacy clause. The Association asked for declaratory and 
injunctive relief to the defendants from enforcing the Virginia 
laws and from enforcing those laws as they applied to federally 
licensed vessels. 11 
Virginia claimed in defense that the crab laws were an exten-
sion of the state's ownership rights in the subaqueous bottom-
lands from which the crabs were harvested. As part of her pro-
perty right in these lands, Virginia could prohibit nonresidents 
from fishing in her waters. In the alternative, Virginia argued 
that it had a compelling interest in its nonresidency laws since 
they were necessary for effective enforcement of the regulations 
needed to protect and conserve the resource, and for preserva-
tion of the peace on the crabbing grounds. n 
Judge \Varriner granted the plaintiffs' request for a perma~ 
nent injunction against enforcement of the residency laws, 
holding that the Virginia statutes, "impermissibly foreclose 
Marylanders from pursuing their calling as commercial crabbers 
in such a way that is repugnant to the Privileges and Immunities 
1iTangler Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1291. 
10Id. at 1289. See supra note 3. 
11 The plaintiffs argued: I) that the Virginia residency laws created 
an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in violation of the com-
merce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3, since the catching, selling, 
processing, and transporting of crabs and crab products were actions in 
the stream of commerce; 2) that the laws denied the plaintiffs their right 
to pursue their livelihood in the commercial harvesting of crabs on the 
basis of their nonresidency in violation of the privileges and immunities 
clause, U.S. CoNST. art. IV,§ 2, cl. I; 3) that these residency restrictions 
infringed on the plaintiffs' right to travel in violation of the equal pro-
tection clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ I; and 4) that the Virginia 
laws were preempted by federal law under the supremacy clause, U.S. 
CoNST. art. VI, § 2, to the extent that the state laws operated to exclude 
federally licensed fishing vessels from Virginia waters, Brief for Plain-
tiff at 5, 13, 22, 28, Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc. v. Douglas, 541 
F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982). 
11Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1292. 
Clause of the Constitution." 1 ' He further ordered Virginia to 
open its portion of the Chesapeake Bay to nonresident blue crab 
fishermen as of October l, 1982. 1 ' 
Virginia's Ownership Claim 
Five years ago, the Supreme Court in Douglas v. Seacoast 
Products, Inc. is held that Virginia statutes limiting the right of 
nonresidents and aliens to harvest menhaden in its territorial 
waters and the Virginia portion of the Chesapeake Bay were 
preemJ)ted by the federal enrollment and licensing statutes. 
While it would seem that this ruling would be dispositive of the 
issue presented in Tangier Sound, the Court in Douglas decided 
the case on statutory grounds, thereby avoiding examination of 
the constitutional challenge to Virginia's residency laws. 26 
Because some of the Tangier Sound plaintiffs did not operate 
federally enrolled and licensed fishing vessels, the court was re-
quired to determine the constitutionality of the state laws. 
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. was important, however, 
because it questioned the validity of the concept of state owner-
ship of natural resources as a justification for discriminatory 
state management practices. Residency restrictions were fre-
quently upheld in cases decided during the 19th century on the 
theory that the natural resources found within the borders of a 
state were the common property of its citizens to be controlled 
and regulated by the state for their benefit. 27 The state, in its 
sovereign capacity, had the right to exercise this "ownership", 
to regulate the taking of fish and wildlife. by excluding non-
residents from any interest in these common state resources. n 
11ld. at 1301. In response to the other three grounds for suit, the 
court ruled as follows: 1) The holding on the privileges and immunities 
clause made it unnecessary for the court to definitively rule on the com-
merce clause challenge. The court, in an extensive discussion of the 
issue, commented that the plaintiffs did not establish that unharvested 
crabs were articles of commerce and that there was little convincing sup-
port for the plaintiffs' claim that their interest "in traversing the state 
boundary to harvest crabs (was) within the purview of the commerce 
clause, either as an article of commerce or as one engaged in the 
associated intercourse thereof." Id. at 1306. Only dictum cited from 
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) supported the 
plaintiffs' claim that discriminatory regulation of the taking of a 
migratory fish species affected commerce in such a way as to be a 
burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 1303-1306. For a different inter-
pretation of the ''affecting commerce'' issue, as applied to regulation of 
commercially harvested fish and shellfish species, see T. Lewis & I. 
Strand, Jr., Douglas v. Seacoast Products; Inc.: The Legal and Eco-
nomic Consequences for the Maryland Oystery, 38 Md. L. Rev. 1 
(1978); 2) The court's holding on the privileges and immunities clause 
encompassed federally licensed plaintiffs as well as non-licensed 
fishermen, nevertheless, the plaintiffs prevailed under their federal 
preemption challenge. Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1306; 3) The 
court held that ''a residency requirement uniformly applied does not 
violate the (equal protection] clause in and of itself." Id. 
1
'Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc. v. Douglas, No. 81-0229-R, 
slip op. at 2 (E.D. Va. Jul. 29, 1982). 
"431 U.S. 265 (1977). 
16 Id. at 272. 
11 For a thorough examination of the general theory of state 
"ownership" of fish and wildlife, see Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 
(1896), oi•erruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), in 
which the Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut statute prohibiting the 
exportation of wild game birds killed within the state against a challenge 
under the commerce clause. The Court ruled that the birds were a com-
mon property resource and that the state could regulate their taking and 
sale to the point of excluding them from interstate commerce, Id. at 
534. In reaching its decision, the Court traced the evaluation of the 
ownership theory from fts origins in Roman and Athenian law through 
its civil and common Jaw antecedents: animalsferae naturae were con-
sidered to be the comrrion property of the citizens of the state. The right 
to control and regulate this common property in game was subject to 
the sovereign's authority to be exercised as a trust for the benefit of the 
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The state ownership concept was a critical component of 
Virginia's Defense in Tangier Sound, although ownership of the 
exploited resource, the blue crab, was not claimed. Virginia 
argued instead that it owned the subaqueous botlomlands 
beneath the navigable waters within its jurisdiction, with all at-
tendant property rights, subject only ·to the right of navigation 
in the water above the lands. The commercial harvesting of the 
crabs involved a physical invasion of the bottom tantamount to 
a trespass. As part of the state's property right in these sub-
merged lands, Virginia claimed that it could permit or prohibit 
anyone from entering or using its property. In sum, since the 
crab licensing statutes were merely an extension of Virginia's 
property rights and were not an exercise of its police power, the 
state could act free of federal or constitutional restraint. 19 
The primary case in support of Virginia's ownership claim is 
McCready v. Virginia, io an I 876 Supreme Court decision up-
holding a Virginia statute which prohibited citizens of other 
states from planting oysters in Virginia's tidal beds. The Court 
ruled in favor of the state 1 against a constitutional challenge 
under the privileges and immunities clause, on the ground that 
Virginia "owned>! the beds, the tidewaters and even the fish, 
"so far as they are capable of ownership while running. "ll Ac-
cordingly, access to fisheries remained within the sole control of 
the state acting on behalf of its citizens. The state could ' 1ap-
propriate" the tidal beds for the exclusive use of its citizens 
because such action was uin effect nothing more than a regula-
tion of the use by the people of their common property."n 
By basing this right on ownership, rather than citizenship, the 
Supreme Court in Mccready upheld a discriminatory state law 
despite the protection provided by the privileges and immunities 
clause of "fundamental" interests or rights: use of-the oyster 
beds of the state was not a privilege or immunity or citizen-
ship. n 
The principle of law articulated in Mccready, and relied upon 
by Virginia here are justification for its restrictive blue crab 
laws, was narrowed by subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
defining the scope of the commerce clause and the privileges and 
immuniti~ clause as applied to state regulation of natural 
people. Id. at 529. For further discussion of the state ownership theory, 
see COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE EvolUTION OF NA-
TIONAL \VJtolfFE LAW ch. II (1977). 
11See, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1825), the first significant interpretation of a privileges and immunities 
clause challenge to state natural resource laws. In Corfield, a New 
Jersey law prohibiting nonresidents from access to oyster beds in the 
state's waters was upheld under the privileges and immunities clause 
and the commerce clause on the ground that the citizens of the state had 
a proprietary right in their fisheries and that New Jersey could validly 
use its police power to ban noncitizen~ from the use of this "common 
property." Id. at 552. 
HTangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1292. 
"94 U.S. 391 (1876). 
Jl/d. at 394. 
llJd. at 395. 
iild. Virginia used this argument to justify the exclusion of 
nonresidents from its waters: 
The right of using Virginia's subaqueous lands for crabb-
ing is not a right of a person or of a citizen as such. Il is a 
part· of the property right in the Commonwealth's real 
property which is below navigable waters. As the Com-
monwealth's property right, it is not, under any constitu-
tional theory, required to be made available to all 
residents of the United States. 
Brief for Defendant at 9, Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc. v. 
Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982). For discussi9n of the 
range of' 'fundamental" rights asserted to be protected by lhe privileges 
and immunities clause, see infra notes 45-48 and accompanying test. 
resources. Indeed, it appeared for a time that the ownership 
theory would be entirely discredited as nothing more than a 
'' 19th century legal fiction expressing 'the importance to its peo-
ple that a State have the power to preserve and regulate the ex-
ploitation of an important resource', 1134 In Douglas v. Seacoast 
Products, Inc., for example, Virginia argued that because the 
states had a title or ownership interest in the fish swimming in 
their territorial waters, they could exclude federal licensees. The 
Supreme Court dismissed this claim 1 stating that: 
A State does not stand in the same position as the 
owner of a private game preserve and it is pure fan-
tasy to talk of "owning" wild fish, birds, or 
animals. Neither the States nor the Federal Govern-
ment, any more than a hopeful fisherman or 
hunter, has title to these creatures until they are 
reduced to possession by skillful capture ... Under 
modem analysis, the question is simply whether the 
State has exercised its police power in conformity 
with the federal laws and Constitution. n 
Virginia claimed in Tangier Sound that its property right in 
the subaqueous bottomlands where blue crabs were harvested 
was distinct from the property right in the fish and wildlife at 
issue in Douglas. Unlike fish and wildlife, which Douglas held 
were ''owned'' by no one until reduced to possession, the lands 
beneath the internal state waters of the Chesapeake Bay were 
clearly owned by Virginia. The state argued that, based on 
ownership, it had a legitimate right to control access to its waters 
since commercial harvesting of blue crabs involved defacement 
of these submerged lands; scraping for "peeler" crabs uprooted 
eelgrass found on the bottom and winter dredging dug up the 
soil. 36 
Rather than distinguishing the case, Judge Warriner applied 
the Douglas dictum on ownership to Virginia's claim. 31 Critical 
to his analysis were two recent Supreme Court cases reevaluating 
the role of the ownership principle in state resource regulation. 
The decisions suggested that the ownership theory was not en-
tirely devoid of meaning or force, but in mirrowly defined cir~ 
cumstances could be used as a justification for privileges and im-
munities clause challenges to discriminatory state licensing 
schemes. 
In 1978, the Supreme Court in Baldwin v. Montana Fish and 
Game CommissionH upheld a Montana statutory elk-hunting 
licensing scheme, which imposed substantially higher license 
fees on nonresidents of the state than on residents, on the 
ground that elk hunting was a recreational activity and not a 
"fundamental" right protected by the privileges and immunities 
clause. Basic to its holding was the Court's reaffirmation that 
the state's "ownership" of, or substantial interest in, the 
disputed resource was an important consideration in the con-
stitutional analysis. Although conflicting federal interests would 
circumscribe that state right, "(t)he fact that the state's control 
over wildlife is not exclusive and absolute in the face of federal 
regulation and certain federally protected interests does not 
compel the conclusion that it is meaningless in their absence." i 9 
\Vhile rejecting the "ownership" label, Baldwin suggested 
that a state, acting as a kind of 11 trustee~· on behalf of its 
HDouglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977), 
citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 iJ.S. 385, 402 (1948). 
HJd. at 284•285, 
HBrief for Defendant at 9-10, Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc. 
v. Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982). A ''peeler" is a recent!}' 
molted crab. 
1
'Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1294. 
"436 U.S. 371 (1978). 
H(T]he States' interest in regulating and controlling those things 
they claim to "own" including wildlife, is by no means absolute. States 
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citizens, retained broad authority to manage the exploitation of 
the fish and wildlife resources found within its jurisdiction. That 
the policy of federalism diminished the force of the ownership 
concept did not undermine the significance of its role in the ex-
ercise of the police power of a state to conserve and protect the 
resource. ' 0 
Hicklin v. Orbeck, ' 1 argued one month after Baldwin, pre-
sented a unique set of facts within which to further define the 
role that the state ownership theory would play when faced with 
a constitutional challenge. In Hicklin, the "Alaska Hire11 Act, 
requiring all holders of state oil and gas leases, pipeline ease-
ments or right-of-way permits lo give employment preference to 
Alaska residents, was held to violate the privileges and im-
murlities clause. The fact that Alaska owned the oil and 
gas-the subject matter of the statute-did not shelter the Act 
from constitutional review, and was not a justification for the 
state's economic discrimination in favor of residents. Instead, 
the state's ownership of the resource was "a factor-although 
often the crucial factor-to be considered in evaluating whether 
the statute's discrimination against noncitizens violates the 
Clause."~1 
Baldwin and Hicklin established that an ownership interest in 
the resource, standing alone, would not exempt discriminatory 
state resource regulation from constitutional scrutiny under the 
privileges and immunities clause. However, when state control 
of a natural resource conflicted with a federally protected right, 
ownership of the resource would be a significant component of 
the analysis, particularly where, as in Baldwin, the state dem-
onstrated a strong conservation need.~-' 
may not compel the confinement of the benefits of their resources, even 
their wildlife, to their own people \\•henever such hoarding and confine-
ment impedes interstate commerce. Nor does a State's control over its 
resources preclude the proper exercise of federal power. ... And a 
State's interest in its wildlife and other resources must yield, when, 
without reason, it interferes with a nonre~ident's right to pursue a 
livelihood in a State other than his own, a right that is protected by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 385+386. 
'
0Id. at 384-386. See also Hllghes·v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 341 
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Note, State Authority to Protect 
Wildlife Preserved As Supreme Court Finally Overtums Geer v. 
Connecticut, 9 ENVIRON. L Rep. 10106 (1978). 
"437 U.S. 518 (1978). 
HOwnership of the oil and gas resources of the state was not a key 
factor in Hicklin because the Court found that Alaska had little or no 
proprietary interest in much of the activity regulated by the Alaska Hire 
Act. Id. at 529. 
nThe Baldwin Court emphasized that preservation of the elk 
depended upon the state's conservation efforts: "The elk supply, which 
has been entrusted to the care of the state by the people of Montana, is 
finite and must be carefully tended in order to be preserved." Baldwin 
v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371,388 (1978). To this 
end, "{a)ppellants' interest in sharing this limited resource on more 
equal terms with Montana residents simply does not fall within the pur-
view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.'' Id. Baldwin and Hicklin 
looked to commerce clause cases for analysis of the ownership doctrine 
as applied to state regulation of natural resources. As noted in Baldwin, 
the privileges and immunities clause and the commerce clause both have 
their source in the Articles of Confederation, art. 4. Id. at 379. The 
ownership doctrine was virtually discredited in commerce clause 
analysis by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332 (1979) which overruled 
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) on the ground that 
"challenges under the Commerce Clause to state regulations of wild 
animals should be considered according to the same general rule applied 
to state regulations of other natural resources." Id. at 335. In so ruling, 
the Hughes Court emphasized the importance of a state's conservation 
efforts in stating that due consideration would continue to be given to 
"legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of wild 
animals underlying the 19th century legal fiction of state ownership." 
Id. at 336. For a thorough analysis of Hughes and Baldwin, see Note, 
H11ghes v. Oklahoma and Baldwin \'. Fish and Game Comm '11: The 
Commerce Clause and State Control of Natural Resources, 66 VA. RE\'. 
1145 (1980) which suggests that the Supreme Court has not satisfactori-
ly developed a unified theory governing state resource regulation. 
In light of these decisions, Judge Warriner ruled in Tangier 
Sound that "in the Court's analysis of a statulory scheme, 
'ownership' of a natural resource is but one factor that the 
Court must consider in determining whether a state has exer-
cised its police power in conformity with federal laws and the 
Constitution. '"' 1 Although the court did not explicitly weigh this 
factor against competing interests in the case, the opinion clear-
ly indicates that Virginia could not use its ownership of the sub-
aqueous bottomlands of the Bay to insulate its discriminatory 
statutory scheme from constitutional review. As in Hicklin, 
where ownership was used as a screen to justify regulation that 
went far beyond the state's proprietary interest in the resource, 
Virginia's exclusion of nonresidents from harvesting crabs in 
state waters was too broad a response to its legitimate right to 
control the use of lands that it owned. 
Validity of Virginia's Residency Restrictions Under 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
In Tangier Sound, the exclusion of nonresidents from access 
to crabs in Virginia waters was an integral part of the state's 
regulatory scheme. Since the plaintiffs were prevented from 
harvesting the resource solely because of their nonresidency, the 
privileges and immunities clause, article IV, section 2, clause 1 
of the United States Constitution, presented the strongest con-
stitutional challenge to the state laws. ,i 
The privileges and immunities clause provides that, "The 
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Im-
munities of Citizens of the several States." The clause was 
enacted to guarantee some degree of equality of treatment for 
citizens of different states under a federalist system. H As inter-
preted by the courts, the primary purpose of the clause was to 
''help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, 
sovereign States. It was designed to insure to a citizen of State A 
who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens 
of State B enjoy."' 1 Although the range of privileges and im-
munities protected by the clause is the subject of considerable 
legal debate, it has been utilized by the courts to protect 
residents of one state from unjustifiable discrimination when 
they entered another state to engage in an essential activity, such 
as the pursuit of a trade, or to exercise a basic right, such as the 
institution of a court action. 43 
"Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1294. Virginia also claimed that 
blue crabs were neither fixed resources, like oysters, nor free~swimming 
fish, like menhaden, thereby distinguishing the case from McCready v. 
Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) and Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 
431 U.S. 265 (1977). Judge Warriner rejected this argument, holding 
that Mccready and Douglas would control, as refined by this recent line 
of Supreme Court cases reevaluating the ownership concept. 
;iSee, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Baldwin v. 
Montana Fish and Game Comm'n., 436 U.S. 371 (1978); and Toomer 
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), all involving privileges and immunities 
clause challenges to state regulation of the taking of fish and wildlife 
which discriminated against nonresidents. 
HAustin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660-661 (1975). While 
the privileges and immunities clause specifically covers state "citizen· 
ship," the clause also encompasses "residency" within its protection. 
"Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948). 
"See Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n., 436 U.S. 371, 
383 (l 978): 
When the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been ap-
plied to specific cases, it has been interpreted to prevent a 
State from imposing unreasonable burdens on citizens of 
other States in their pursuit of common callings within the 
State, Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1871); in the 
ownership and disposition of privately held property 
within the State, Blake v. McC/ung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898); 
and in access to the courts of the State, Canadian North· 
ern R. Co. U. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920). 
There has been substantial disagreement on the proper focus of the 
privileges and immunities clause, i.e., whether it was designed to insure 
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In Tangier Sound, the plaintiffs argued that the crab licensing 
laws violated the privileges and immunities clause because the 
laws denied them the right to travel freely from state to state 
to pursue their livelihood. In bringing suit, the Marylanders 
claimed the right to harvest crabs on the same terms as Virginia 
residents, subject only to reasonable state regulation of the 
resource. 49 
Whether state regulation violates the privileges and im-
munities clause depends, first, on the kind of activity that is be-
ing regulated. Baldwin established that before a state statute will 
be subject to review under the privileges and immunities clause, 
the asserted right involved must be "fundamental." The right of 
a nonresident to earn a livelihood without being restricted by 
unjustified state discrimination was determined by the Baldwin 
Court to be such a fundamental right. Therefore, where the ac-
tivity was commercial in nature, like the harvesting of blue crabs 
for commercial marketing, state discrimination against non-
residents pursuing that activity would -be scrutinized under the 
standard of review established for privileges and immunities 
analysis. However, if the regulated activity was not basic to the 
nonresident's livelihood, but was rather recreation or sport, 
then its regulation would not fall within the purview of the 
privileges and immunities clause. 10 
Since state action in Tangier Sound involved regulation of the 
commercial taking of blue crabs, as opposed to regulation of 
recreational fishing, Virginia's statutory scheme was subject to 
constitutional scrutiny under the privileges and immunities 
clause. The standard of review for determining whether a state 
statute violated the privileges and immunities clause was 
established in the 1948 case of Toomer v. Witsell, 51 in which the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a South Carolina statute 
requiring nonresidents to pay license fees for shrimping in the 
three-mile maritime belt off the state coast that were 100 times 
greater than those paid by residents. The Court found that 
South Carolina's rationale for the unequal licensing system, 
conservation of its shrimp supply, did not justify the severe 
discrimination practiced upon noncitizens. To pass scrutiny 
under the privileges and immunities clause, the state must 
establish a 'substantial' reason for the discrimination against 
nonresidents beyond the fact that they are citizens of other 
states, and the degree of discrimination must bear a 'close rela-
tion' to 'valid independent reasons' for the disparity of treat-
ment. In Toomer, the purpose and effect of the statute were not 
to conserve shrimp, as the state claimed, but impermissibly to 
exclude nonresidents. n 
positive or "substantive natural" rights against all government in-
terference, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1825); or whether it was intended to have the proscriptive effect of pro-
tecting nonresidents from unjustifiable state discrimination, see Hague 
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 ( 1939). A more recent interpretation, Austin 
v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660-6SI (1975) suggested that the 
clause established a "norm of comity without specifying the particular 
subjects as to which citizens of one State coming within the jurisdiction 
of another are guaranteed equality of treatment.'' Because of the confu-
sion over the scope of the privileges and immunities clause, it has been, 
and will continue to be, applied on a case-by-case basis. L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 6-32, 6-33 (1978). 
"Brief for Plaintiff at 13, Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc. v. 
Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982). 
1
"Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371,387 
(1978): "With respect to such basic and essential activities, interference 
with which would frustrate the purposes of the formation of the Union, 
the States must treat residents and nonresidents without unnecessary 
distinctions." But see Justice Brennan's dissent in Baldwin in which he 
argues that the issue of whether a given right is "fundamental" should 
not be an element of the analysis under the privileges and immunities 
clause. Id. at 402 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
"334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948). 
'
1/d. at 396, 397. 
The Court in Toomer held that discrimination against non-
residents could only be justified if nonresidents were demon-
strably interfering with legitimate state objectives that could not 
be remedied in less discriminatory ways. 1n each case, the in-
quiry under the privileges and immunities clause \vould focus on 
whether there was reasonable relationship between the danger 
presented by noncitizens as a class and the discrimination prac-
ticed against them. The Court concluded that South Carolina's 
highly disproportionate fee system was contrary to the primary 
purpose of the clause "to outlaw classifications based on the 
fact of noncitizenship unless there is something to indicate that 
noncitizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the 
statute is aimed."H 
Aware of the standard of review articulated in Toomer, 
Virginia argued that it had a "compelling interest" in its 
residency laws for effective enforcement of regulations 
necessary to protect and conserve the resourceJ and to preserve 
the peace over the crabbing grounds. The state claimed that 
allowing nonresidents to fish in its waters would lead to deple-
tion of the crab stocks through increased harvesting efforts and 
would require the stiite to impose substantially higher licensing 
fees to limit the number of crabbers. H 
Judge \Varriner held that, contrary to the state's claim, the 
severe discrimination against Maryland crabbers in excluding 
them entirely from Virginia waters did not bear a close relation 
to the stated conservation objectives of the statutory scheme. 
The evidence did not support the claim that the exclusion of 
Maryland residents per se was necessary for the conservation of 
Virginia crabsJ since any harm to the fishery would be ihe result 
of too many harvesters, regardless of their state of residence. 
The fact that the state placed no licensing limit upon the number 
of Virginians in its waters was further evidence that the state's 
conservation claim was spurious. Using the complete exclusion 
of nonresidents as its primary conservation method placed an 
impermissible discriminatory burden on the Maryland crabbers. 
Virginia has endeavored through its statutes to 
place almost the entire burden of conservation on 
nonresidents, with no showing that they are the 
source of the evil. This Virginia cannot do. A crab· 
ber, whether from Maryland or Virginia, must be 
free to engage in his livelihood of pursuing his 
peripatetic quarry subject only to reasonable, non-
discriminatory rules related to those Virginia im-
poses on its citizenry. ss 
Virginia also argued that an open fishery would create law en-
forcement problems by increasing the number of open water in-
spections, the degree of nonresident violators who failed to ap-
pear in its courts and the incidence of disputes among crabbers 
over the fishing grounds. 56 The Judge accepted Virginia's argu-
n1d. at 398. 
HBrief for Defendant at 12-14, Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc. 
v. Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982). 
HTangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1301. Judge Warriner noted that 
the optimum sustainable yield for blue crab ha~ not yet been deter-
mined for the fishery. Blue crab landings increased from the 1880's to 
the mid 1960's when landings peaked at 45,000 metric tons in 1966. In 
general, landings fluctuated near the mean between 1952 and 1979. Id. 
at 1290. See B. J. Rothschild, P. W. Jones, J. S. Wilson, Trends in 
CheSapeake Bay Fisheries, contribution No. 1133, Center for En-
vironmental and Estuarine Studies of the University of Maryland. 
16Brief for Defendant at 10·1 l, Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc. 
v. Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982). 
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ment that law enforcement would be difficull to execute if its 
waters were opened up to nonresidents: "{TJhc evil anticipated 
with respect to the problem of law enforcement does appear to 
lie in the fact of nonresidency itself." However, likening en-
forcement efforts on the water to those on the state's highways, 
"where commercial traffic from all States are required to obey 
Virginia traffic laws," Judge Warriner concluded that enforce-
ment of the fishery laws on open water would be "tolerable."J7 
In light of the unconstitutionality of its current laws, Judge 
Warriner charged Virginia with the responsibility of enacting 
new regulations for the crabbing industry which would be of 
uniform application. He noted, however, that Virginia could 
charge nonresidents a "reasonable and appropriately higher" 
fee for their licenses. Finally, the parties were invited to submit 
memoranda to the court establishing guidelines for the transi-
tion to an open fishery on the Chesapeake this fall. 58 
Conclusion 
Tangier Sound is a classic example of the conflict between 
state action and federally protected rights. The outcome in this 
case, open access to the Chesapeake Bay to harvest blue crabs, is 
yet another step taken by the courts in shifting the balance away 
from unfettered state authority over natural resources towards 
the recognition that a state has some limited responsibility for 
noncitizens who wish to exploit fish and wildlife found within its 
borders. 
The Tangier Sound case demonstrates that outright discrimi-
nation against nonresidents in the issuance of commercial licens· 
ing fees and permits will be suspect, regardless of the ownership 
interests of the state. Commercial fishermen must be allowed to 
pursue their livelihood across state boundaries, subject only to 
reasonable, nondiscriminatory state regulation. A state will, 
however, continue to exercise substantial authority in utilizing 
its police power to regulate and preserve the exploitation of its 
natural resources, including commercial fisheries, so Jong as the 
methods used are reasonably related to the stated management 
objectives. Still unanswered by this case is the extent to which 
the need to conserve the resources owned by the state can be 
used to impose differential management schemes on non-
citizens. 
Judge \Varriner's decision will have implications for other 
migratory fisheries, which are regulated on a state-by-state 
basis. Like the Virginia and Maryland regulation of the blue 
crab fishery, states often enforce discriminatory management 
practices which favor their own citizens against nonresidents. 
To avoid a repetition of Tangier Sound, the states which employ 
these practices should explore methods of cooperative regula-
tion of their fisheries. Ill 
11Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1301. 
HTangier Sound Waterman's Assoc. v. Douglas, No. 81-0229-R, 
slip op. at 2 (E.D. Va. Jul. 29, 1982). 
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